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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
EMINENT DOMAIN -VALUATION IN PARTIAL-TAKING CASES
W HEN the federal government condemns air space over private property
adjacent to an air base, thereby acquiring only the legal right to keep
the space clear of obstacles and structures, the question arises whether the
assessors of just compensation' may, in addition to awarding damages for
the actual easement taken and damages to the remainder caused by the
taking of the easement, consider also the diminution in value of the remain-
ing property caused by anticipated aircraft flight over the property.
In two recent condemnation cases, 2 the declaration of taking3 described
easements above the "glide angle plane" which extended outward from the
ends of airport runways and over certain privately owned property. The
"glide angle plane" was described in both cases as an imaginary line serving
as a ceiling over the land above which obstructions or structures would not
be permitted to extend.
The government contended that in acquiring the right to prevent the
landowners from erecting structures which would rise above the "glide
angle plane," it did not also acquire easement rights to fly aircraft over the
land of the condemnees. Compensation for the easement taken, the govern-
ment argued, should be computed by determining the value of the property
before the easements were taken, and the value immediately thereafter, the
difference being the compensation to be paid to the condemnee. The govern-
ment urged that this "after" value be based on the effect produced on the
remaining property by the actual easement taken, without considering dam-
ages from illegal or unauthorized use of the easement. This reasoning
would exclude damages from anticipated flights over the property, presum-
ably on the theory that the negative easement acquired by the government
was limited to keeping a designated air space clear of obstructions, and did
not give the condemner the affirmative right to fly aircraft through this
space.4
The landowners replied that the government at the time of the eminent
domain proceedings was flying aircraft at low altitudes over the property,
that it would continue to do so, and that the purpose of the easement was
to facilitate future flights. Therefore, compensation should be assessed on
the basis of the present and potential use of the easements for aircraft flight
purposes, in relation to the effect of such use on the real estate value of the
remaining property.
In United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land,5 the Texas federal district court
held that damages may be awarded only for the actual easement taken in
the declaration of taking. Hence, where the only easement condemned is the
right to remove and prevent an obstruction from extending into or above
the "glide angle plane," damages awarded may not include diminution in
real estate value resulting or likely to result from flights of aircraft over
such property. The court said that the compensation should reflect the
value of condemnee's property after the taking based on the "obstruction"
easement and nothing more.6
A different approach to the valuation problem is illustrated by the
decision of a New York federal district court in United States v. 48.10 Acres
of Land.7 The court ruled that any loss or depreciation in real estate value
caused by anticipated aircraft flight had to do with the future and could
See pages 107-112 for footnotes.
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not be considered in the assessment of compensation.8 With apparent incon-
sistency, however, the court stated in its valuation formula that the test was
whether a prospective purchaser would pay the price which he otherwise
would have paid if no easement existed, such price to be determined from
an appraisal of the property's fair market value.9 It is submitted that this
theory in fact contemplates the expressly excluded aircraft damages. The
decision, in effect, indicates that, while compensation must be gauged by
the effect of the actual easement acquired on the remainder, this effect
should be measured by the reaction of the market to the presence of the
easement and not by an artificial standard that may be legalistically correct
but realistically unjust..'0
These two cases, while presenting substantially similar fact situations,
offer divergent treatment of the valuation problem. If federal district courts
in the future follow the fairly restrictive decision of the Texas court, many
legitimate claims to compensation will be exposed to dissipation in the uncer-
tainties attendant to statutory action, where the latter course is pursued
after the eminent domain suit. Assuming that the real estate value of
condemnee's land has been deflated by anticipated aircraft flight, but that
he has been compensated merely for the value of the "obstruction" easement,
the dissatisfied condemnee may seek recognition and satisfaction of his
claim in tort under the Federal Tort Claims Act or in implied contract
under the Tucker Act.11
However, even if the claimant pursues his statutory remedies, he may be
deprived of relief by the application of "res judicata." Thus, a court may
feel that the amount of compensation for damages to the remainder was or
should have been determined in the original eminent domain proceeding, and
that the damage for which the claimant now sues was in fact caused by the
authorized use to which the easement was put. Under this view, the present
suit would be held not to constitute a new cause of action, and therefore.
would be barred by res judicata.1 2 If the court decides that the condemnee's
allegations amount to a new cause of action, it might then hold that the
judgment in eminent domain was conclusive only as to the award for the
value of the "obstruction" easement. Although collateral estoppel would
preclude further consideration of the "obstruction" easement issue, res
judicata would not apply to prevent the claimant from recovering the drop
in market value resulting from the influence of aircraft flights on the
remainder. Clearly, however, this latter possibility is dependent on the
court's finding of a cause of action distinct from that on which the earlier
award to the landowner was based.' 3
If he is successful in establishing the separate cause of action, the owner
must still convince the court that he has suffered actionable damages, i.e.,
damages above and beyond those compensated for in eminent domain. He
may find this very difficult. There is no binding obligation on the govern-
ment to pay for property merely because it is damaged. Before there can
be recovery, the property must be so severely damaged as to be "taken" in
the constitutional sense.14 While the flight of aircraft might materially
lessen the fair market value of the property, such activity might not amount
to a compensable taking.' 5 Before a compensable taking can be found, there
must be proved some actual physical damage impairing the utility of the
land. 1 The unfortunate situation may materialize in which aircraft do not
pass over the owner's land to a degree sufficient to justify compensation on
the basis of a taking or on a theory of trespass, and yet the mere likelihood
of such flight, where a negative easement has been taken, may result in a
substantial decrease in the value of the land in the eyes of the market.
If the condemnee is successful in proving the existence of actionable
damages, he is entitled theoretically to recover an amount equal to the harm
JUDICIAL
suffered. The court may allow a lump sum payment to cover all the claim-
ant's losses, varying according to the degree of harm suffered. Where it is
apparent that the flights have already damaged the property and that they
will continue to do so, damages may be awarded for past and prospective
future invasions of the land.17 If the interference is deemed temporary,
however, the court may limit compensation to a specific period of time,
perforce casting the burden and expense of-periodic suits on the landowner
who finds that the statutory award does not represent his actual damage.
There is also a hazard from the standpoint of the government, i.e., it
may be compelled to pay twice for the same taking if the condemnee pursues
his statutory remedy to a successful conclusion. It is possible that the award
made in the statutory suit will be so large, in relation to the degree of harm
actually suffered, as to include in fact the eminent domain award. It should
be remembered that a variety of elements must be considered in determin-
ing damages; courts have a tendency to rely heavily on expert testimony,
much of which is often slanted in favor of the property owner's interests.' 8
Although it is possible that an excessive award may be scaled down or
rejected by a reviewing court, 19 in federal courts, where the assessment of
compensation may be made by a commission, the commission's report will
not be rejected unless the trial judge considers it "clearly erroneous. 20
It is submitted that, in the light of past practice, the danger to the govern-
ment of double liability in these circumstances, is real and substantial.
21.
The holding in United States v. 4.48 Acres of Land opens the door to
further litigation of claims that should have been disposed of in the eminent
domain proceeding. By a more realistic approach to the valuation problem,
the Texas federal district court could have avoided the narrow decision it
reached and thus could have obviated to an appreciable extent this threat
of future litigation. The court did not dispute the generally accepted rule
in partial-taking cases--cases in which the condemner does not take the fee
but only a part thereof-that the condemner must pay compensation not
only for what he has taken, but also for damages to or diminution in the
market value of the remainder caused by the taking and authorized use of
the easement. 22 By a strict reliance on the terms of the declaration of
taking, however, the court was led to a technical decision. The court held
that the government acquired title only to the exact easement described in
the declaration, and that the court is powerless to enlarge the easement or
rights which the government has condemned and acquired therein. The
court concluded that the diminution in value of the remainder caused by the
taking of the easement, must be computed on the basis of the legal use to
which the easement taken could be put, and that being merely the right to
keep the air space free of obstructions above the "glide angle plane." 23 The
court apparently was impressed by the fact that the government did not
acquire the affirmative right to fly aircraft through the easement, and so
held that potential aircraft flight could not be an element in the valuation
problem. While the court in United States v. 48.10 Acres employed a more
liberal recovery theory, it agreed in principle with the Texas court that
damages from future flights were not in issue and hence not includible in
valuation. That principle is questionable.
The declaration of taking described an easement giving the government
the right to prevent obstructions from protruding above the "glide angle
plane." The seemingly obvious fact that the purpose of the easement was
to facilitate air traffic was not referred to in the declaration. The assessors
of compensation, in the Texas case, were limited in their consideration to
the most damaging use of the easement that the taker would have the legal
right to make, this legal right being determined by a liberal construction of
the declaration of taking. The assessors were not permitted to consider the
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actual damages that would ensue due to the close relation of the functional
purposes of the easement to the operation of the air base.
A more realistic approach would be to base the government's liability
on the easement's maximum use. On the facts of the 4.43 Acres case, this
might have been accomplished by requiring the government to amend its
complaint to specify the use to which the taken easement is to be put.24 In
the absence of such amendment, however, the effect of the decision could
still have been avoided by ruling that the scope of the rights acquired is
limited to clearance, but that the maximum use of such rights is to abet
imminent air traffic. Indeed, logically it could be said that the easement
was acquired for "necessary purposes" connected with flights from the
adjacent air base.25
Such a rationale does not violate the proposition relied on in the Texas
case that a court may not enlarge rights acquired in the declaration of
taking. In saying that the government acquired rights to effectuate a partic-
ular purpose or function, the rights themselves are left untouched. The
direct relation between the actual easement acquired and the air base is
implied in the declaration, and from the standpoint of property valuation,
is not severable. 26
As long as the government continues to acquire avigation easements
without specifying their basic utility for aircraft purposes, the issue of
assessing just compensation in such circumstances will have to be faced by
the courts, and conceivably many legitimate claims will suffer in the process.
It is desirable, therefore, that a uniform formula of assessment be adopted
by the federal courts in these cases which will eliminate superfluous litiga-
tion and define and protect the rights of the parties concerned. It is sub-
mitted that such a formula is in existence, although it has been sparingly
used. The formula requires that damages to the remainder be included in
the value of the part taken.27 Perhaps the chief virtue of the formula lies
in the fact that it can be used to reflect the market reaction to the partial-
taking, which should form the basis of the compensation assessment.
Any formula, if used wisely in a given instance, may result in an accept-
able determination. The problem, however, is to find that valuation theory
which is the most adaptable to a systematic, uniform application by the
courts. The "before and after" test, mentioned in connection with the
4.43 Acres case, has received favorable comment from an eminent authority
in the eminent domain field.2 8 In practice, however, it has been confused
frequently with other less desirable formulas, with a corresponding lack of
consistency among the decisions in which the "before and after" test has
been used.29
Concededly, the "damages to the remainder included in the value taken"
formula is also subject to misapplication. Using it, the Texas district court
could have reached the same decision it did. The fault lies not with the
formula, but with the court applying it. However, the suggested test elimi-
nates the conditions which often have resulted in awards out of all propor-
tion to the actual damage suffered. 0 Furthermore, when used on the basis
of market reaction to the easement in avigation easement cases, it will enable
courts to lay the foundation for determination of awards which will be more
truly reflective of the interests of the condemnee. Other, more popular
valuation theories have been used extensively with a great deal of confusion
as the result. Certainly, therefore, in the interests of uniformity and justice,
the courts in the future should give the most serious consideration to the





1 The fifth amendment provides that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
2 United States v. 48.10 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land, 137 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Tex. 1956).
3 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-e (1952). The Declaration of Taking
Act provides that in any proceeding brought by the government for the acquisition
of any land or easement for the public use, the condemner may file with the com-
plaint, or at any time before judgment, a declaration of taking, declaring that the
lands described are taken for the use of the United States. It is imperative that the
declaration allege the specific public use for which the land is being taken, together
with a sufficient identification of the lands and a statement of the estate or interest
in said lands taken. The condemner must also state the sum of money estimated
by it to be just compensation for the lands taken. Upon the completion of this
procedure, the act vests in the government both title and possession to the con-
demned property, although litigation may continue as to the final amount of the
compensation and its distribution. United States v. .8677 Acre of Land, 42 F. Supp.
91 (E.D.S.C. 1941).
The Declaration of Taking Act is a supplementary condemnation statute per-
missive in nature and designed to vest title to the described condemned property
in the United States immediately upon the filing of a deposit in court, pending the
condemnation proceedings. It also gives the condemnee an immediate right to have
his compensation determined in the same proceeding. If the condemnee's title is
clear, he will be given an immediate cash payment to the extent of the government's
estimate of the value of the property. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
However, since just compensation is determined as a judicial function, the amount
deposited in conformance to the act may be increased or diminished upon finaljudgment. United States v. Catlin, 142 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1944). Upon filing the
declaration and making the deposit, the government becomes irrevocably bound to
pay the ultimate award regardless of whether or not the award is within the
prescribed limits. Hessel v. A. Smith & Co., 15 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Ill. 1936).
If a district court refers the matter of compensation to a commission, the
commissioners are to determine the amount based on the exact easement or estate
condemned as described in the declaration of taking. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A(h). Dam-
ages resulting from unauthorized use of the condemned land by the government,
a use not sanctioned in the declaration of taking, whether expressed in terms of
claims for damages or for just compensation for property taken, are claims against
the United States, and as such may be asserted in the United States Court of
Claims or in a federal district court under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1952); 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952), or in a district court under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1952). But it would seem that such claims may not
be asserted by way of counterclaim in a condemnation proceeding, since this would
allow a suit against the United States in a manner and in a court in which the
government has not consented to be sued. Oyster Shell Products Corp. v. United
States, 197 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1952); State Road Dept. of Florida v. United
States, 166 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1948).
4 The government conceded that under circumstances not presented in the
4.48 Acres case, an appropriation of the condemnee's property by flights of low-
flying aircraft might be compensable. But its theory was that prospective use of
the superadjacent air space over the condemned property for aircraft flight was
independent of the avigation easement acquired, and that damages resulting from
the possible materialization of such aircraft rights did not flow from the taking
of the easement.
The "obstruction" easement taken by the government is a negative easement
in that it merely prohibits a certain activity by the condemnee; the acquisition of
the legal right to fly aircraft over the condemnee's property would be an affirmative
easement. In the cases under consideration, the government did not take an affirma-
tive easement, and it would be improper to award damages on the basis of an
affirmative easement unless such easement has in fact been taken. Moreover, a
court can not award compensation on the assumption that the taking of a negative
easement will be followed by the taking of an affirmative one. Insofar, therefore,
as the government contended that damages could not be awarded for the taking of
an affirmative right to fly aircraft over the owner's property, it was correct. The
theory of this comment, however, is that in order to determine fairly the damages
that flow from the taking of a negative easement (the "obstruction" easement)
a proper valuation formula must consider the interrelation of the right to keep
air space free of impediments and the complementary presence of an air base with
its attendant air traffic. See text at note 25 infra.
5 137 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Tex. 1956).
6 The court expressed their unwillingness to allow the claim for damages for
diminution in real estate value due to anticipated aircraft flights: ". . . If the
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commissioners are allowed in determining the amount of just compensation to take
into consideration past or probable future aircraft flights over the land of these
condemnees, and in effect to compensate therefor, the government will be required
to pay for something which it has not acquired, and for which it may be compelled
to pay damages or just compensation in subsequent proceedings." 137 F. Supp.
at 572.
7 144 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
8 On this point, the opinion cited United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land, 137
F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Tex. 1956). The landowners had claimed damages from fear,
noise, vibration and psychological effects, and for impairment of utility of the farm
lands for residential development purposes, relying on United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946). The facts indicated that more than one year had passed since
the easements were taken, and that the flights of aircraft which had transpired
had not impaired the utility of the land for residential development. In the 4.43
Acres case, there was similar evidence of present flights although it was held
insufficient to amount to a taking. As to damage claims pertaining to noise, vibra-
tion, etc., it appears that the New York court rightfully excluded them. See United
States v. 26.07 Acres of Land, 126 F. Supp. 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
9 The court added that where residential property is involved, there must be
proof of a reasonably imminent demand and market, as of the date of the taking,
citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934). Furthermore, the burden of
proof in establishing damages suffered as the result of the imposition of the ease-
ment, 'rests on the owner, not on the government. Westchester County Park Comm.
v. United States, 143 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 726 (1944).
10 The court reasoned that: "Where avigation easements are sought for land
adjoining an air base, the land being farm land but situated in an area that is
under development for residential purposes, the value should be determined by
taking into consideration the limitation imposed on the use of the land in the
future. Although there is no showing that the present utility of the land for farm
purposes has been impaired by the easements, the marketability of the property
may be impaired in the future if it is to be used for residential development pur-
poses." 144 F. Supp. at 258.
The court commendably indicated that the loss in real estate value for residen-
tial purposes is to be computed by what price the remainder will bear if offered for
sale. This view would seem impliedly to acknowledge that the market, i.e., the
willing purchaser, might be unfavorably impressed with the avigation easement
in its relation to air traffic.
1128 U.S.C. § 2671 (1952) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1952) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952).
12 The rule that a judgment bars future action between the same parties or
their privies with respect to the same cause of action applies to judgments in
eminent domain proceedings. Scheer v. Kansas-Nebraska Gas Co., 158 Neb. 668,
64 N.W.2d 333 (1954). It has been held in cases under the Tucker and Federal
Tort Claims Acts, that an award of compensation in eminent domain proceedings
is conclusive as to every matter which could have been included therein, whether
or not it was in fact included. E.g., South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority v. 11,754
Acres of Land, 123 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1941).
13 An interesting discussion of this problem is to be found in Schopflocher,
What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?
21 Ore. L. Rev. 319 (1942). It is said that courts have reached conflicting results
even though professing to apply identical rules of law which the author feels is
partially due to the vagueness of the term "cause of action." The article contends
that these conflicting results can be explained only by the existence of two funda-
mental but conflicting policies:
(1) A judgment is "properly a bar on principles of public policy,
because the peace and order of society, the structure of our judicial
system, and the principles of our government require that a matter
once litigated should not again be drawn in question between the same
parties or their privies." Freeman, Judgments 1318 (5th ed. 1925).
This policy is based on the interests of the defendant, who "should not
be twice vexed for the same cause" and on the interests of the public
and the state, which bear the expense for the organization of courts,
the access to which must be free from obstructions by multifarious
suits.
(2) On the other hand, there is a strong policy not to cut off
substantive rights of a litigant by a struct application of the rules of
procedure. "All procedure is merely a methodical means whereby the
court reaches out to restore rights and remedy wrongs; it must never
become more important than the purpose which it seeks to accom-
plish." Clark v. Kirby, 243 N.Y. 295, 153 N.E. 79 (1926).
According to which of these policies is considered to be stronger,
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the theory of what constitutes a cause of action varies even in the
same jurisdiction; as between various types of cases, precedents may
determine the policy. Id. at 321.
Keeping in mind the fact that the landowner who sues under one of the per-
missive statutes ordinarily will be attempting to enlarge his earlier award in
eminent domain, the following statement is significant:
. . . [T]here is a fundamental difference between situations in
which the plaintiff [landowner] sues after recovery and those in which
he sues after defeat. If he sues after recovery, it may be that the
facts which are added for the purpose of increasing the ... recovery
and are alleged to constitute a new cause of action have already
affected the amount of the first recovery. It is a fundamental policy
of the law not to permit double recovery. To carry out this policy the
courts are prone to stretch the concept of cause of action when they
rationalize the result. It would be dangerous to assume that the same
courts would have applied the same concept of cause of action if the
first action had been decided against the plaintiff for reasons material
only to this first cause of action. Id. at 358.
Thus, where the landowner unsuccessfully claims aircraft damages to his
property in the eminent domain proceeding, and then attempts to prosecute this
claim further under statutory authority, it is quite conceivable that the court might
decide that he has failed to establish a cause of action disinct from that on which
he received the condemnation award. That, in fact, he was suing on the "identical
accusation" forming the basis of the original award.
14 Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913) (The mere location of a
battery of guns which had not been fired for more than eight years, and which the
government had no intention of firing, except in case of war, held not an appro-
priation for military purposes of the land within their firing range).
15 Some idea may be gained from the following decisions as to the degree of
impairment necessary to constitute a compensable taking. Where the noise and
glaring lights of planes landing at or leaving an airport leased to the United
States interfered with the normal use of a neighboring farm as a chicken farm,
there was held to be such a taking as to give the owner a constitutional right to
compensation. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). A servitude imposed
by the government on land adjoining its fort was held a taking within the law
of eminent domain where the government repeatedly fired guns of the fort across
the land and had established a fire control service there. Portsmouth Harbor Land
& Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922). A corporation chartered by
Congress to construct a tunnel and operate railway trains therein was held liable
for damages in the suit of an individual whose property was so injured by smoke
and gas forced from the tunnel as to amount to a taking of private property.
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
16 The degree of physical damage that must be proved by the residential prop-
erty holder is difficult, if not impossible, to define. In the Causby case, supra note
15, where the property involved was a chicken farm, it was held that the effect
produced on the chickens by the low-flying aircraft destroyed the utility of the
property and hence was an actual physical damage to or unreasonable interference
in the use of the property. Where residential property is involved, however, and
no surface rights have been taken by the condemner, the path to success for the
claimant suing for impairment of the utility of the property is thorny indeed.
The cases cited note 15 supra, indicate instances in which the landowner pre-
vailed in his claims. The presence of noxious odors and active guns near residential
property offer fairly obvious examples of actual physical interference in the use
of the property. But where the damages complained of result from aircraft, the
litigant faces added subtleties. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp. 84 F.2d 755
(9th Cir. 1936). The court in the Hinman case, applying the legal premise that
the essence of the legal right of property is dominion over it, rejected the conten-
tion that the landowner has title to all space above his land ad infinitum, and held
that he had rights only to such a height as is, or might become, useful to the
enjoyment of his property. The court pointed out that any use of such space which
is injurious to the land, or which is in fact an actual interference with the posses-
sion or beneficial use, would be a trespass for which the owner would have a
remedy. However, the court continued, mere use of the space above the land by an
airplane would not of itself constitute actionable trespass. In this regard, such
grievances as discomfort from noise, vibration and other inconveniences of a
similar character were discounted as a basis for a trespass claim. To maintain an
action in trespass, the court concluded, the complainant must allege a case of actual
and substantial damage, supported by facts and circumstances.
The question arises, might a diminution in the utility of the land for purposes
of sale on the market constitute such an "actual and substantial" damage? It has
been held that an interference with the value of private property may constitute
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a "taking." City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69 N.W.2d 909 (1955);
State v. Bentley, 231 Minn. 531, 45 N.W.2d 185 (1950). See also Burger v. St. Paul
241 Minn. 285, 64 N.W.2d 73 (1954), in which the court remarked: "... [Statute]
defines taking by condemnation proceedings in this state to include every interfer-
ence, under the right of eminent domain, with the ownership, possession, enjoyment,
or value of private property ..."
Whether or not the particular court in which the condemnee brings suit will
follow this reasoning, in the absence of a similar statute, is one of the risks facing
the litigant who seeks statutory relief after failing to collect in the eminent domain
proceeding.
Between the extremes of a taking and a mere annoyance, there is a twilight
zone in which the landowner has few guiding standards. A court unimpressed with
his evidence (assuming that the plaintiff has first succeeded in establishing a
good cause of action) will find no more than a technical trespass and award
nominal damages, or else reject the allegations in toto. ". . . [A]Ithough a legal
injury to plaintiff is proven, yet if the extent of the injury is not shown, nor
evidence given from which it can be inferred, nominal damages only can be recov-
ered." Murray v. Pannaci, 130 Fed. 529, 530 (3d Cir. 1904).
17 Restatement, Torts § 930 (1939) ; McCormick, Damages § 127(2) (b) (1935).
18 "The mere fact that the courts rely so completely on expert testimony need
not be in itself a ground of criticism, but what makes it deplorable is that the courts
often accept these estimates blindly because of their own inexperience with real
estate valuation.... The tribunal's task is not made easier by the fact that perhaps
the most important qualification of an expert witness from the point of view of
the party employing him is his ability to evade questions and to conceal or gloss
over facts that are disadvantageous to his employer's side of the case.
"A court or jury is . . . likely to make some arbitrary compromise, usually
by splitting the difference between the respective estimates. This practice encour-
ages fantastic claims by property owners' witnesses, and estimates, deliberately
undercut, by condemners' appraisers. It puts a premium on perjury. . . . It is
unfair to conservative appraisers who have a strong sense of their professional
standing, and it places at a disadvantage those owners who set their claims at what
they consider the actual market value, rather than at a figure that takes into
account the possibility that the tribunal will split the difference between the
respective estimates." 2 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain, § 247 at 262
(2d ed. 1953).
19 Generally, however, the practice seems to be for the appellate courts to let
condemnation decisions stand as long as the compensation allowed falls somewhere
between the respective estimates of the various expert witnesses. One reason for
this seems to be the great bulk of the condemnation records which appellate courts
are not eager to peruse. This attitude "has led to the prevalent impression that the
appellate courts will not reverse on questions of quantum. The latter impression is
correct insofar as it implies that, within wide limits, the appellate courts will
permit findings of the trial courts or commissioners to stand." 2 Orgel, Valuation
Under Eminent Domain § 247 at 262-63 (2d ed. 1953).
20 6 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 27.3(2) at 341 (3d ed. 1953).
21 Theoretically, of course, the final judgment in the original proceeding is
res judicata with respect to the same cause of action in future proceedings, where
the same parties are involved. Where the condemnee succeeds in enforcing his claim
in a statutory action, the original award in respect of the "obstruction" easement
therefor should be excluded from the assessment of compensation.
22 "To say that such an owner would be compensated by paying only for the
narrow strip actually appropriated, and leaving out of consideration the deprecia-
tion to the remaining land by the manner in which the part was taken, and the
use to which it was put, would be a travesty upon justice." United States v.
Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 185 (1911).
23 Potential uses beyond the scope of the declaration of taking or such similar
charter of taking may not be considered in awarding just compensation in the
condemnation proceeding. Where the taker makes such use of the property beyond
the scope of the instrument of taking, the condemnee will be entitled to additional
compensation in a new action. Chicago & N.W. R.R. v. Milwaukee, R & K Elec.
Co., 95 Wis. 561, 70 N.W. 678 (1897).
24 United States v. Chicago B & Q RR., 90 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 714 (1937). In this case, the government was required to make its petition
more specific, to enable the landowner to determine and make proof of damage to
the remainder of his property resulting from the uses to which the government
intended to put the part actually taken. The government had condemned 1.6 acres
of the railroad's tract for the purpose of constructing a lake. The railroad contended
that the government was actually taking more than it had described in the declara-
tion of taking, in that, due to the height of the dam to be constructed, more of
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defendant's land would be flooded than the actual estate condemned. Subsequently,
the government filed an additional complaint condemning the land for which
damages were claimed. On review, the government protested that the trial court's
action in effect had compelled it to accept and pay for more rights than it had
asked. The appellate court admitted that this might be true but decided that the
consolidation of suits was preferable in that duplication of damages, and the
danger of multiplicity of suits would be avoided, as well as securing to the con-
demnee an opportunity to have adjudicated all damages suffered because of the
intended use of the property taken.
In the 4.43 Acres case, the government contended that if further damages
were inflicted on the remainder of the property beyond the amount awarded for
the actual easement taken, the condemnee would have the right to sue under one
of the permissive statutes. In reference to the facility of this remedy, the appellate
court in the Chicago B & Q R.R. case commented: "... [T]he appellee [landowner]
proceeded on the theory that by virtue of the physical appropriation of the 1.6
acres, the government impliedly agreed to compensate appellee for all proximate
damages to its remaining property occasioned by the construction and use of the
dam, and that recovery therefore was authorized by the Tucker Act . . . that
unless appellee presented all its claims for proximate damages to its remaining
property at the time of the physical appropriation of the land it would be barred
thereafter from recovering those omitted. Appellee's contentions in these respects
are sound .... If appellee had not asked that the complaint in the first action be
made more specific, or if it had not presented its claim in that action for damages
to its remaining property, but had merely gone to award on the value of its interest
in the ... land, it might have been placed in a very embarrassing situation in its
effort to recover damages to the remaining property on the theory of an implied
contract, especially if the government had chosen not to file any subsequent petition
(for an increase in the size of the original taking) and certainly it was not neces-
sary for it to do so. The government contends that as a result of (the trial court's
order) it was compelled to accept and pay for more rights than it asked. This
objection is not tenable . . . because by filing, the government impliedly agreed to
pay for all damages to the remaining property, proximately caused by the use of
that which it had physically appropriated. Hence, it will be presumed to have
demanded the right to cause the damage for which it was liable." - (Emphasis
supplied) 90 F.2d at 167.
It is interesting to note that the opinion cited the Tucker Act as authority for
awarding the condemnee all damages resulting from the maximum use of the right
acquired rather than upon its maximum intended use. It is not unreasonable to
conclude, where the government condemns an "obstruction" easement, that the
maximum intended use of the easement as defined by the declaration of taking is
to keep the air space free of impediments, but that the maximum use will be to
clear the way for air traffic.
The reviewing court in the Chicago B & Q R.R. case said that the government
manifested a "legitimate" purpose to place the condemnee in the "very embarrass-
ing" position of having to rely on the implied contract theory in a later proceeding
and so take his chances that the judgment in the original eminent domain suit
would not bar later recovery under the Tucker Act.
This purpose, while termed "legitimate," seems rather hard-boiled. The court
had little difficulty in favoring the cause of the condemnee as it was of the opinion
that all of the damages for which the government might be liable because of its
maximum use of the property could be awarded in one action.
25 Chicago, K. & N.R. Co. v. Van Cleave, 52 Kan. 665, 33 Pac. 472 (1894).
Under the law of eminent domain, a railway had condemned a strip of the owner's
property for a right-of-way, but its track had been constructed on land other than
the condemnee's, but adjacent to it. The legal right acquired by the railway in the
use of the strip was to construct embankments and certain pits along the side of
the roadbed from which material would be taken for the embankments. The con-
demnee claimed damages due to the affect on his remainder of the operation of
the railroad on the adjacent property, along with other damage claims not material
here. In upholding the owner's position, the court held that the land had been taken
"for necessary purposes connected with the construction and operation" of the
road. The court commented that the condemner was not limited to the use of the
one roadway already constructed on the adjacent property, but might, if it chose,
construct tracks on the strip taken from the condemnee's land or move its line over
onto such land.
The applicability of this reasoning to the case of the "obstruction" easement
is impelling. Without the right of clearage, the functioning of the air base is
subject to the theoretical hazard of the landowner's erecting a structure that would
penetrate into the air space above the "glide angle plane." It could logically be
asserted that the easement was taken "for necessary purposes connected with the
operation" of the air base.
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26 Whether or not the intended use of an easement for a purpose less obvious
than in the principal cases could figure in the determination of compensation, is
not material to the problem under consideration.
27 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 49 at 232-34 (2d ed. 1953).
The author explains the philosophy behind the rule in the following words:
".. . [A] court, if unwilling to concede any exception to the principle that com-
pensation should be limited to property that is 'taken,' might nevertheless recognize
claims for damages to remaining property by holding that the value of the part
which is 'taken,' is a value based on the significance of this part to the owner's
entire property. Such a holding . . . would be quite in accord with economic and
accounting conceptions of 'value to a going concern.' "
In Louisiana Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty v. Board of Levee Commissioners,
143 La. 90, 78 So. 249 (1918), where the condemner of a plot of land for levee
purposes cited the relevant provision in the state constitution requiring compensa-
tion only for the value of the property taken, the court held that although the
condemnee could recover compensation only for the value of the part taken, such
value should be measured by reference to the fall in value of the remainder result-
ing from the taking of a part. It is worth interjecting at this point, that the court
did not limit the fall in value of the remainder by some "use" theory, in relation
to the part taken.
Orgel suggests that the formula has failed to gain widespread employment
because "its logical implications are so obvious that they would embarrass the
courts in placing whatever limits they wish to place on the recovery for 'conse-
quential damages' resulting from the taking of a specific property."
28 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 64 at 290 (2d ed. 1953).
According to the author, the "before and after" rule, literally interpreted, would
avoid the danger of double counting of damages and come closer to a true approxi-
mation of the actual damage suffered by the property holder.
29 One of the "less desirable" formulas with which the "before and after" rule
has been confused, is the "value plus damages" test. Briefly, the latter test in its
operation requires two things: 1. that the part taken be valued by the price for
which it could be sold separately, divorced from the whole; and 2. that the decrease
in the sale price of the whole resulting from the taking of a part, also be measured.
The objection to this rule, is that a jury too often will include as damages to the
remainder a part of the same injury which it included in the value of the part
taken. The result, in many cases, is an excessive damage award. Despite its literal
meaning, the "before and after" test has been so frequently misconstrued in appli-
cation with the "value plus damages" test, that its positive utility in future cases
is open to question. Id. at 236, 238, 290-94.
30 These conditions being the factors attendant to the process of assessing
damage based on some theory of value of the part taken and damage to the re-
mainder resulting from the taking. Perhaps the chief merit of the "damages to
the remainder included in the value of the part taken" formula, in the interests
of efficient, equitable disposition of condemnation suits, is that it does not require
the prevailing practice of computing two sets of damages.
